민병대와 군국주의
부제: The Militia and Militarism
저자: 로자 룩셈부르크
출처: hhttps://www.marxists.org/archive/luxemburg/1899/02/26.htm , https://gall.dcinside.com/mgallery/board/view/?id=kpd&no=57042
The Militia and Militarism
저자: 로자 룩셈부르크
This is not the first time, and hopefully not the last, that critical voices concerning particular points in our programme and tactics have been heard from the party’s rank and file. In itself this cannot be welcomed enough. However, the most important thing is how the criticism is made, and by this we do not mean the ‘tone’ which it has unfortunately become fashionable to employ in the party in calling for a show of hands on every occasion. Rather, we mean something far more important – the general basis of the criticism, the specific Weltanschauung that is expressed in the criticism.
In fact Isegrim-Schippel’s [‘Isegrim’ was a pseudonym for Schippel] crusade against our demand for a militia and in favour of militarism rests upon a very consistent socio-political Weltanschauung.
The most general standpoint upon which Schippel bases his defence of militarism is his belief in the necessity of this military system. Using all possible arguments of a technical, social and economic nature, he demonstrates the absolute necessity of a standing army. And from a certain point of view he is quite correct. A standing army and militarism are indeed indispensable – but for whom? For the present-day ruling classes and the contemporary governments. Now what can one conclude from this other than that, from the class standpoint of the present government and ruling classes, doing away with the standing army and introducing the militia, i.e. arming the people, must appear to be an impossibility, an absurdity? And if Schippel, for his part, likewise regards the militia as an impossibility and an absurdity, then he is only revealing that he himself shares the bourgeois point of view on the question of militarism, and that he views it through the eyes of the capitalist government or the bourgeois classes. This is also demonstrated clearly in each of his individual arguments. He claims that to equip all citizens with weapons, which is a basic tenet of the militia system, would be impossible because there is not enough money for this. ‘Culture suffers enough as it is,’ he says. He bases his argument simply on the present Prusso-German public economy; he cannot imagine a different economy, for example one which makes use of progressive taxation of the capitalist class in order to finance the militia system.
Schippel considers the military training of youth – another basic tenet of the militia system – as undesirable because, he says, the non-commissioned officers as military trainers would exert the most corruptive influence on youth. Here of course he bases his argument on the present Prussian non-commissioned barracks-officer and simply extrapolates him as an educator of youth into his imaginary militia system. Schippel’s view of the situation is a vivid reminder of Professor Julius Wolf,[1] who sees an important objection to the social order of socialism in that under its rule, according to his calculations, the general rate of interest would rise ...
Schippel considers the militarism of the present day to be economically indispensable because it ‘relieves’ the economic pressure on society. Kautsky makes every conceivable effort to guess how the Social Democrat, Schippel, might have conceived that this militarism could ‘release’ of pressure. Kautsky then accompanies each possible explanation with an excellent refutation. It seems, however, that Schippel has not taken up the matter as a Social Democrat, nor from the point of view of the working people at all. When he speaks of a ‘release’ of pressure, it is obvious that he is thinking of capitalism. And in this he is of course correct: for capitalism, one of the most important forms of investment is militarism; from capitalism’s point of view, militarism is indeed a ‘release’ of pressure. That Schippel here speaks as a real advocate of the interests of capitalism is revealed by the fact that he has found a qualified authority to support him in this point.
‘I claim, gentlemen,’ someone said in the Reichstag session of January 12th, 1899, ‘that it is quite incorrect to say that the Reich’s debts of two million concern only unproductive expenditures, and that these are not offset by productive income of any kind. I claim that there is no investment more productive than expenditures for the army.’ To be sure, the minutes of that session report ‘Mirth on the Left’ ... The speaker was Baron von Stumm. [A major German industrialist and armaments manufacturer.]
It is characteristic of all Schippel’s claims that not only are they intrinsically wrong, but they are also based on the perspectives of bourgeois society. Thus, considered from a Social-Democratic viewpoint, everything that Schippel says seems to be upside down: the standing army is indispensable, militarism is economically beneficial, the militia is impracticable, etc.
One is struck by the similarity between Schippel’s perspective on the question of militarism and his attitude to another important question of the political struggle, namely customs policy.
Firstly, and most strikingly, we find in his treatment of both questions a refusal to recognize their connection with positions on the issue of democracy and reaction. If we are to believe Schippel’s lecture at the Stuttgart Party Conference, the claim that free trade is identical with progress and that protective tariffs are identical with reaction is wrong. Long and broad historical experience, he continues, proves that one may well be simultaneously a freetrader, and a reactionary or, on the other hand, a supporter of protective tariffs and an ardent friend of democracy. We are now informed, in almost the same words, that: ‘There are militia enthusiasts who afflict our working life with endless disruptions and interruptions, and who themselves seek to transplant the non-commissioned officer’s mentality into our boys and young lads right down to the lowest school grades – which is much worse than the present militarism. There are opponents of the militia who are mortal enemies of each and every extension of this kind of military intrusion and requisition.’ [Die Neue Zeit (1898-9), 580-81]
The fact that in these, as in all questions, the bourgeois politicians do not adopt a position based on principle, that they follow a policy of opportunism, leads the Social Democrat, Schippel, to conclude that he too has the same right. He therefore necessarily fails to appreciate the inner reactionary core of protective tariffs and of militarism, and, conversely, the progressive significance of free trade and of the militia; that is, he too fails to adopt a position based on principle towards the two questions.
In the second place, we find in his position on both issues an opposition to the individual evils involved in the policy of protective tariffs and of militarism, with a determined refusal to combat both phenomena as such in their entirety. In Schippel’s lecture in Stuttgart we were informed of the necessity of combatting excessive individual protective tariffs, but at the same time we were warned not to ‘commit’ ourselves, not to ‘tie our hands’, which meant not to oppose the protective tariff always and everywhere. Now we are informed that, although Schippel would not reject ‘the struggle, carried on in parliament and through agitation, against concrete military demands’ [ Sozialistische Monatshefte, November 1898, p.495.], he warns against ‘taking purely external chance occurrences and very incidental, but admittedly also very conspicuous reactions (of militarism) in the remaining social spheres to be the essence and the core of militarism’. [Die Neue Zeit (1 no.19)]
Thirdly and finally, the foundation of the two viewpoints mentioned above is in both cases the evaluation of the phenomena exclusively from the point of view of the previous bourgeois development, that is, from their historically conditioned progressive aspect, while disregarding completely further imminent developments which reveal their reactionary aspect. For Schippel the protective tariff remains what it was at the time of the late Friedrich List, more than half a century ago: a great advance beyond the medieval-feudal economic fragmentation of Germany. That today universal free trade already represents the same necessary progression beyond the national economic structure to a unified global economy, thus making today’s national tariff barriers reactionary – this fact, as far as Schippel is concerned, does not exist.
The same is true of the question of militarism. He still approaches it from the point of view that it is the same great step forward as was the standing army based on universal and compulsory conscription vis-à-vis the former enlisted army and feudal army. But here the development stops as far as Schippel is concerned; history does not progress beyond the standing army, except for a further extension of universal conscription.
What then is the significance of these characteristic positions which Schippel adopts on both the tariff and military questions? They signify, firstly, an ad hoc policy rather than one based on principle. Secondly, and connected with this, they attack merely the abuses of the tariff and military systems rather than the system itself. But what is this policy other than our well-known acquaintance from recent party history – opportunism?
Again ‘practical politics’ celebrate their triumph in Isegrim-Schippel’s open renunciation of the militia postulate, one of the basic points in our whole political programme. From the party’s point of view, the real significance of Schippel’s appearance lies herein. This most recent Social-Democratic proclamation in favour of militarism can be judged and evaluated correctly only in connection with this whole current and from the view-point of the general foundations and consequences of opportunism.
II
The most fundamental characteristic of opportunistic policy is that it always and consistently leads to the sacrifice of the movement’s ultimate goal, namely the liberation of the working class, to its most immediate, indeed imaginary interests. That this is the case with Schippel’s policy can be demonstrated clearly by one of his main tenets on the question of militarism. The most important economic reason which, according to Schippel, compels us to retain the system of militarism is that this system is a ‘release’ of economic pressure on society. Let us set aside the fact that this peculiar claim ignores the simplest economic facts. On the contrary, let us assume for a moment, in order to characterize this point of view, that this preposterous claim is true, that militarism does in fact ‘release’ the pressure on society created by surplus productive forces.
How can this phenomenon operate on behalf of the working class? Ostensibly in such a way as to rid it of a part of its reserve army, i.e. those who force down wages, by maintaining a standing army; in this way its working conditions improve. And what does this mean? Only this: in order to reduce the supply in the labour market, in order to restrict competition, the worker in the first place gives away a portion of his salary in the form of indirect taxes in order to maintain his competitors as soldiers. Secondly, he makes his competitor into an instrument with which the capitalist state can contain, and if necessary suppress bloodily, any move he makes to improve his situation (strikes, coalitions, etc.); and thus this instrument can thwart the very same improvement in the worker’s situation for which, according to Schippel, militarism was necessary. Thirdly, the worker makes this competitor into the most solid pillar of political reaction in the State and thus of his own enslavement.
In other words, by accepting militarism, the worker prevents his wages from being reduced by a certain amount, but in return is largely deprived of the possibility of fighting continuously for an increase in his wage and an improvement of his situation. He gains as a seller of his labour, but at the same time loses his political freedom of movement as a citizen, so that he must ultimately also lose as the seller of his labour. He removes a competitor from the labour market only to see a defender of his wage slavery arise in his place; he prevents his wages being lowered only to find that the prospects both of a permanent improvement in his situation and of his ultimate economic, political and social liberation are diminished. This is the actual meaning of the ‘release’ of economic pressure on the working class achieved by militarism. Here, as in all opportunistic political speculation, we see the great aims of socialist class emancipation sacrificed to petty practical interests of the moment, interests moreover which, when examined more closely, prove to be essentially illusory.
The question arises, however, as to how Schippel arrives at his seemingly absurd idea of declaring that, even from the standpoint of the working class, militarism is a ‘release’. Let us recall how the same question appears from the point of view of capitalism. We have demonstrated that for capitalism, militarism creates the most profitable and indispensable kind of investment. Now it is evident that the same monies which the government acquires through taxation serve to maintain militarism. Had they remained in the people’s hands, however, they would have represented an increased demand for foodstuffs; or, had the State used these monies on a larger scale for cultural purposes, a corresponding demand for social works would have been created. It is also evident that militarism is by no means a ‘release’ of pressure on society as a whole. This question takes on a different aspect only from the view-point of capitalist profit-making, from the entrepreneur’s point of view. For the capitalists, there is indeed a difference as to whether a certain demand for products comes from isolated private buyers or from the State. The State’s demand is distinguished by the fact that it is certain, that it orders in enormous quantities, and that its pricing is favourable to the supplier and usually monopolistic – all of which makes the State the most desirable customer and makes supplying it the most alluring business for capitalism.
But what makes supplying the military in particular essentially more profitable than, for example, State expenditures on cultural ends (schools, roads, etc.), is the incessant technical innovations of the military and the incessant increase in its expenditures. Militarism thus represents an inexhaustible, and indeed increasingly lucrative, source of capitalist gain, and raises capital to a social power of the magnitude confronting the worker in, for example, the enterprises of Krupp and Stumm. Militarism – which to society as a whole represents a completely absurd economic waste of enormous productive forces – and which for the working class means a lowering of its standard of living with the objective of enslaving it socially – is for the capitalist class economically the most alluring, irreplaceable kind of investment and politically and socially the best support for their class rule. Therefore, when Schippel abruptly declares militarism to be a necessary ‘release’ of economic pressure, not only does he apparently confuse societys interests with that of capitalism’s interests, thus – as we said at the outset – adoptng the bourgeois point of view, but he also bases his argument on the principle of a harmony of interests between capital and labour by assuming that every economic advantage to the entrepreneur is necessarily an advantage to the worker as well.
Schippel takes the same familiar perspective on the tariff question. Here, too, he has come out in favour of the protective tariff in principle, since, as he claims, he desires to protect the worker as producer against the ruinous competition of foreign industry. In this policy, just as in the military bill, he sees the worker’s immediate economic interests and overlooks his other social interests which are connected with the general social progress towards free trade or towards the abolition of the standing army. And in both cases, he assumes uncritically that the interest of capital is also the immediate economic interest of labour, since he believes that all that is advantageous to the entrepreneur is also advantageous to the worker. To sacrifice the ultimate ends of the movement to practical and momentary success, and to evaluate our practical interests from the viewpoint of a harmony of interests between capital and labour – these two principles are indeed interconnected harmoniously, for they are the essence of all opportunistic politics.
At first glance one might be surprised that an advocate of this policy finds it possible to invoke the authors of the Social-Democratic programme and in all seriousness (since his authority in the military question is Baron von Stumm) to consider Friedrich Engels as his authority in the same question. Schippel presumes to share Engels’s insight into the historical necessity and the historical development of militarism. This, however, only proves once again that, just as before with badly digested Hegelian dialectics, now the badly digested Marxist interpretation of history leads to the most hopeless confusion in one’s head. Once more it is demonstrated that both the dialectical method in general and the materialist philosophy of history in particular, however revolutionary they may be when understood correctly, produce dangerously reactionary consequences the moment they are comprehended wrongly. If one reads Schippel’s quotes from Engels, especially those from Anti-Dühring, concerning the development of the military system to the point where it dissolves itself and becomes a people’s army, it is at first glance unclear where the difference between Schippel’s and the party’s usual interpretation of the question actually lies. We regard militarism in its very essence as a natural and inevitable product of social development – so does Schippel. We believe that the further development of militarism leads to the people’s army – so does Schippel. Where then is the difference which can lead Schippel to his reactionary opposition to our demand for a militia? The answer is very simple: whereas we share Engel’s view that the logic of the development of militarism into the militia must entail the dissolution of militarism, Schippel believes that the people’s army of the future will grow of its own accord, ‘from within’ the present military system. Whereas we, supported by the material conditions given us by the objective development (namely the extension of universal conscription and the decrease in the length of service), aspire to bring about the militia system by means of political struggle, Schippel relies on the intrinsic development of militarism with its consequences, and brands as fantasy and hot-house politics every conscious intervention aimed at effecting the militia.
What he arrives at in this way is not Engels’s interpretation of history, but Bernstein’s. Just as for Bernstein the capitalist economy ‘grows into’ a socialist economy automatically, step by step and without a sudden transition, so for Schippel the people’s army automatically grows out of contemporary militarism. Both Bernstein and Schippel – the former with regard to capitalism as a whole, the latter with regard to militarism – fail to understand that objective developments merely provide us with the pre-conditions for a higher developmental stage; that, without our systematic intervention, without the political struggle of the working class for the socialist revolution or for the militia, neither will ever be realized. However, since the facile notion of a ‘natural growth’ is merely a chimera, an opportunistic subterfuge to avoid the resolute revolutionary struggle, the social and political changes attainable in this manner shrink into a wretched bourgeois patchwork. Now in Bernstein’s theory of a ‘gradual socialization’, all that we understand by the concept of socialism ultimately disappears, and socialism becomes ‘social control’, that is, a number of harmless bourgeois social reforms; in the same way Schippel’s notion of the ‘people’s army’ transforms our goal of a free people in arms, itself deciding on war and peace, into a system of universal conscription extending to all citizens fit for active service, modelled on the present system of the standing army, but with a shorter term of service. If applied to all the aims of our political struggle, Schippels concept leads directly to the abandonment of the entire Social-Democratic programme.
Schippel’s support for militarism is a palpable illustration of the whole revisionist current in our party and at the same time an important step in its development. Earlier we learned from a Social-Democratic deputy in the Reichstag, Heine, that under certain circumstances one might grant military requisitions to the capitalist government. But this was intended merely as a concession to the higher purposes of democracy. At least according to Heine, cannons were to serve only as objects of value to exchange for popular rights. Now Schippel declares that the cannons are necessary for their own sake. If in both cases the result is the same, namely support for militarism, at least in Heine’s case it rests upon a false conception of the Social-Democratic method of struggle, while in Schippel’s case it originates in his altering the object of struggle. The former proposes not Social-Democratic but bourgeois tactics, but the latter brazenly substitutes a bourgeois programme for the Social-Democratic programme.
Schippel’s ‘scepticism’ concerning the militia represents the logical conclusion of ‘practical politics’. They cannot become more reactionary, but can only extend into the other points in the programme; ‘practical politics’ can then only cast aside the remaining Social-Democratic garments with whose tatters they have draped themselves and stand revealed in their classical nakedness – as Pastor Naumann. [National Social Party in imperial Germany, advocate of ‘Christian Imperialism’]
III
If Social Democracy were a club for discussing socio-political questions, it could consider the case of Schippel as closed after a theoretical argument with him. Since it is a party of political struggle, however, it does not consider that demonstrating the theoretical errors involved in Schippels point of view solves the problem, but rather only raises it. Schippel’s publication on the militia is not only an expression of a certain idea, it is also a political act. Thus the party must answer it not only by refuting its views, but also through political action. And this action must correspond to the significance of Schippel’s remarks.
During the course of the past year, the absolute validity of virtually all the postulates which until now have been considered as the cornerstones of Social Democracy has been shaken by attacks from our own ranks. Eduard Bernstein declared that the ultimate goal of the proletarian movement meant nothing to him. Wolfgang Heine demonstrated with his proposals for compensation that the established Social-Democratic tactics in fact mean nothing to him. Now Schippel proves that he too is superior to the political programme of the party. Virtually not a single principle of the proletarian struggle has been spared from being dissolved into nothing by a few deputies of the party, On the face of it, this is hardly a gratifying picture. However, one must differentiate among these very significant proclamations as regards the party’s interest. Bernstein’s critique of our theoretical assets is without doubt portentous. Practical opportunism, however, is incomparably more dangerous to the movement. So long as it is strong and healthy in its practical struggle, the movement can itself simply shrug off any scepticism concerning its ultimate goal. However, the moment the immediate goal, that is, the struggle itself, is called into question, then the whole party with its ultimate goal and movement – not only in the subjective interpretation of this or that party philosopher, but also in objective reality – becomes nothing.
Schippel’s attack is directed at only one point in our political programme. But this single point, in view of the fundamental significance of militarism to the present state, means in fact a renunciation of Social Democracy’s whole political struggle.
In militarism, the power and rule of both the capitalist state and the bourgeois class are crystallized; just as Social Democracy is the only party which opposes them in principle, so too, inversely, is the opposition in principle to militarism part of the nature of Social Democracy. To abandon the struggle against the military system amounts in fact to the same thing as renouncing the struggle against the present social order in general. We stated at the conclusion of the previous section that it remained only for opportunism to extend Schippel’s position on the military question to other points of the party programme in order to abjure Social Democracy completely. We were thinking only of the subjective, conscious development of the supporters of this policy. Objectively, considered in terms of the facts, this development is consummated in Schippel’s statement.
One more aspect of the recent opportunist pronouncements, and especially of Schippel’s contribution, is deserving of attention, at least in view of its symptomatic value. This is the playful ease, the imperturbable calmness, indeed even the serene grace with which principles are undermined, principles which must have entered the flesh and blood of every comrade who does not interpret the party’s good in a wholly superficial manner, and which, when they are shaken in this way, should occasion at least a serious crisis of conscience on the part of every sincere Social Democrat. Apart from everything else, these are unmistakable signs that a nadir in the revolutionary level has been reached, that the revolutionary instinct has been blunted - phenomena which in themselves might be unintelligible and inessential, but which are without doubt essential to a party such as Social Democracy, which is forced to rely at present largely not on practical but on abstract successes, and which necessarily makes great demands on its members’ individual intellectual level. Opportunism’s bourgeois manner of thinking is suitably complemented by its bourgeois manner of perception.
The implication of Schippel’s pronouncement, extending as it does in all directions, necessitate a corresponding counter-pronouncement by the party. What can and must this counter-action be? Firstly, a clear and unambiguous stand on this question by the entire party press, and a similar discussion of the matter at party congresses. If the party as a whole is not in agreement with Schippel’s point of view (according to which public meetings are merely occasions when one throws the bones of ‘slogans’ into the starving crowd so that at the right time it will elect its political ‘superiors’ to the Reichstag), then it also cannot regard the discussion of the most important party political principles as a ‘preserve of the nobility’, meant only for the selected few and not for the great mass of comrades. On the contrary, only when the discussion is carried into the broadest groups of the party can the possible spreading of Schippel’s views be successfully prevented.
Secondly, and even more important, the Social-Democratic Reichstag fraction must state its opinion. It above all is qualified to give the definitive word on the Schippel affair because, on the one hand, Schippel is a deputy of the Reichstag and a member of the fraction, and on the other, the question with which he deals is one of the major objects of its parliamentary struggle. We do not know whether or not the fraction has done anything in the matter. Since soon after the publication of Isegrim’s article it was an open secret as to whose name the pseudonym concealed, the parliamentary party has in all probability not looked on idly while one of their members has made a mockery of their own activity.
And, if they had not done so before, they could have made up for lost time after Kautsky had stripped Schippel of his wolf’s clothing. Regardless of whether or not the Reichstag fraction has taken a stand on Schippel’s case, the result is roughly the same so long as it has not informed the whole party of its stand. Forced to operate on the parquet floor of a bourgeois parliamentarism which is alien to its real nature, Social Democracy has apparently unwillingly and unconsciously adopted many of the customs of parliamentarism which cannot properly be made to agree with its democratic character. Among these, in our opinion, are included, for example, the parliamentary party’s behaving as a unanimous corporate body not only towards the bourgeois parties (which is entirely necessary), but also towards its own party – which can lead to an unhealthy situation. The parliamentary representatives of the bourgeois parties, whose parliamentary struggle is fought out largely in the insipid form of wire-pulling and bartering, have every reason to avoid the light of publicity. By contrast, the Social-Democratic parliamentary fraction neither needs nor has reason to consider the results of its deliberations as an internal matter the moment party principles or more important tactical questions are involved. To settle such questions only in secret meetings of the parliamentary party would be sufficient if we, like the bourgeois parties, were concerned solely with ultimately achieving a certain unanimous show of hands by the parliamentary party in the Reichstag. For Social Democracy, however, the parliamentary struggle of its Reichstag fraction is far more important from the point of view of agitation than practical activity; it is a question not of a formal majority decision by the parliamentary party, but of the discussion itself, of clarifying the situation. For the party it is at least as important to know what its representatives’ opinions on the parliamentary questions are as to know how they vote en bloc in the Reichstag. In a party which is democratic through and through, the relationship between voter and deputy may under no circumstances be considered as fulfilled by the act of voting and by the more outwardly formal and summary reports given at party conventions. Rather the parliamentary party must maintain as lively and continuous a contact as possible with the party masses, and this in particular will become the simple imperative of self-preservation, in view of the opportunistic currents which have recently come to light precisely among our party parliamentarians. A public stand on Schippel’s statements by the parliamentary party was and is necessary because the party masses, however much they might wish to, simply do not have the physical possibility of expressing their opinion as a whole on this question. The parliamentary faction is an appointed political representative of the whole party and should have helped the party indirectly, by taking the lead, to articulate its necessary position.
Thirdly and finally, the party as such must give direct expression to its views concerning the case of Schippel, and this it must do in the sole form at its disposal – at the next party congress.
In the discussion in Stuttgart concerning Bernstein’s articles, it was said that the party conference could not vote on theoretical questions. But now, in the case of Schippel, we have a purely practical question. It was said that Heine’s compensation proposals were only inopportune castles in the air which the party need not take into consideration. Now in Schippel’s case we have castles on the ground. Indeed, in Schippel’s stand on the militia question, the policy of opportunism, as already stated, is taken to its logical conclusion, and has become ripe for decision. It seems to us that the party must undertake the urgent task of drawing the correct conclusions from this development and must take a clear and unambiguous stand on it.
It has every reason for doing this. It is a question of a Reichstag deputy, a political representative of the party, who is, by virtue of his office, supposed to serve the party as a sword in its struggles and whose action should act as a dam against attacks by the bourgeois State. If, however, the dam can at any moment become transformed into papier mache and if the sword breaks in battle as though it were made of cardboard, may not the party for its part say to this policy:
Away with the pap, I have no need of it! No swords will I forge with paste!
[1] A leading social scientist of the time, and Luxemburg’s teacher at the University of Zurich, Wolf always symbolized for her the most arid aspects of bourgeois academicism.
번역문
* 제 1장만 번역되었다.
당의 대오에서 우리 강령과 전술의 특정한 부분에 대한 비판적 목소리가 들려오는 것은 처음도 아니고 바라건대 아마 마지막도 아닐 것이다. 이것 자체만으로는 더할 나위 없이 환영할 일이다. 그러나 가장 중요한 것은 그 비판이 어떻게 가해지는가이며, 이것은 당에서 찬동을 받기 위해 매번 동원하는 것이 불행하게도 유행이 된 ‘어조’를 뜻하는 것이 아니다. 그것보다 훨씬 더 중요한 것인 비판의 일반적 기반, 비판에서 표현된 특정한 세계관(Weltanschauung)을 뜻하는 것이다.
사실 우리의 민병대 요구에 반대하고 군국주의에 찬성하는 이세그림(Isegrim)-쉬펠(Schippel)[‘이세그림’은 쉬펠의 필명이었다]의 십자군은 아주 일관적인 사회-정치적 세계관에 기반하고 있다.
쉬펠의 군국주의에 대한 옹호가 기반하고 있는 가장 일반적인 입장은 이 군사 체계의 필연성에 대한 그의 믿음이다. 기술적, 사회적, 경제적 본성에 대한 가능한 모든 주장을 사용해서 그는 상비군의 절대적인 필연성을 논증한다. 그리고 특정한 관점에서 그는 상당히 옳다. 상비군과 군국주의는 정말로 필요 불가결하다. 누구를 위해서? 현재의 지배계급들과 정부들을 위해서. 이제 누가 이것에서 현 정부와 지배계급의 입장에서는 상비군을 폐지하고 민병대를 도입하는 것, 즉 인민을 무장시키는 것이 불가능하고 부조리한 것으로 나타날 수 밖에 없다는 것 외에 무슨 결론을 내릴 수 있겠는가? 그리고 만약 쉬펠이 마찬가지로 민병대를 불가능하고 부조리한 것으로 여긴다면 그는 단지 그 자신이 군국주의의 문제에서 부르주아의 관점을 공유한다는 것, 그 문제를 자본주의 정부나 부르주아 계급의 눈으로 보고 있다는 것을 드러낼 뿐이다. 이것은 또한 그의 개별적 주장들 하나 하나에서 분명하게 논증되었다. 그는 민병대 체계의 기본 교의인 모든 시민들을 무장시키는 것이 이를 위한 충분한 돈이 없기에 불가능할 것이라고 주장한다. ‘문화는 이미 충분히 고통받고 있다’고 그는 말한다. 그는 그의 주장을 단순히 현재의 프로이센-독일 공공 경제에 기반하고 있다; 그는 다른 경제를, 예를 들어 민병대 체계에 재정을 대기 위해 자본가 계급에 대한 누진세를 사용하는 경제를 상상할 수 없다,
쉬펠은 민병대 체계의 또다른 기본적 교의인 청년들의 군사적 훈련을, 그가 말하길, 부사관들이 군사 훈련관으로서 가장 부패한 영향을 청년들에게 행사할 것이기 때문에 바람직하지 않은 것으로 간주한다. 여기서 물론 그는 그의 주장을 현재의 프로이센 병영 부사관에 기반을 두고 있고 그의 상상속의 민병대 체계에서 청년의 교육자로 단순히 외삽하고 있다. 쉬펠의 상황에 대한 시각은 사회주의의 사회 체계에 대한 중요한 반대를 그의 계산에 따르면 사회주의 지배 아래에서 일반이자율이 상승할 것이라는 데에서 보던 율리우스 볼프(Julius Wolf)[1] 교수를 생생하게 떠오르게 한다…
쉬펠은 오늘날의 군국주의가 사회에 대한 경제적 압력을 ‘완화시키기’ 때문에 경제적으로 필요불가결하다고 간주한다. 카우츠키는 어떻게 사회민주주의자인 쉬펠이 이 군국주의가 압력을 ‘해소’할 수 있다고 확신할 수 있는지 추측하기 위해 상상할 수 있는 모든 노력을 기울였다. 카우츠키는 그러고는 각각의 가능한 설명들에 훌륭한 논파를 곁들였다. 그러나 쉬펠은 완전히 그 문제를 사회민주주의자로써도, 노동계급의 관점으로도 받아들이지 않은 것으로 보인다. 그가 압력의 ‘해소’에 대해 말할 때, 그가 자본주의에 대해 생각하고 있다는 것은 분명하다. 그리고 여기서 그는 당연히 옳다. 자본주의에서 군국주의는 투자의 가장 중요한 형태 중 하나이다. 그러므로 자본주의의 관점에서, 군국주의는 정말로 압력의 ‘해소’다. 쉬펠이 여기서 자본주의의 이해를 위한 진정한 대변자로서 말하고 있다는 것은 그가 그를 지지하는 검증된 권위를 이 지점에서 찾은 것으로 드러난다.
‘신사분들, 저는 주장합니다,’ 누군가가 1899년 1월 12일의 제국의회 회기에서 말했다, ‘제국의 이백만 채무가 오직 비생산적인 지출에 대한 것이라고, 그리고 어떤 생산적 수입도 이것을 상쇄해주지 못한다고 말하는 것은 아주 부정확한 것이라고 말입니다. 저는 군대에 대한 지출보다 더 생산적인 투자는 없다고 주장합니다.’ 틀림없이 회기 회의록은 ‘좌파의 킬킬거림’을 기록하고 있다… 연사는 슈툼 남작(Baron von Stumm)[주요 독일 산업가이자 무기 생산자]이었다.
모든 쉬펠의 주장들의 성격은 내재적으로 그릇될 뿐 아니라 부르주아 사회의 관점에 입각해있다. 그러므로 사회민주주의 관점에서 고찰해볼 때 쉬펠이 말한 것은 거꾸로 된 것으로 보인다. 상비군은 필요불가결하다, 군국주의는 경제적으로 유익하다, 민병대는 실용적이지 않다 등등.
쉬펠의 군국주의 문제에 대한 관점과 그의 다른 중요한 정치투쟁의 문제, 즉 관세정책에 대한 태도의 유사점은 흥미를 일으킨다.
첫번째로 그리고 가장 충격적이게도 우리는 그의 두 문제들에 대한 취급에서 그 문제들이 민주주의와 반동이란 주제에 대한 입장에 연결되어 있다는 것을 인식하는 것에 대한 거부를 발견한다. 우리가 만약 쉬펠이 슈투트가르트 당 학회에서 한 강의를 믿는다면, 자유 무역은 진보와 동일하고 보호 관세는 반동과 동일하다는 주장은 틀렸다. 길고 넓은 역사적 경험은, 그가 계속하길, 누군가가 자유무역론자인 동시에 반동주의자거나 아니면 보호관세의 지지자이면서 민주주의자의 열렬한 친구일 수 있다는 것을 증명한다. 우리는 이제 거의 같은 단어들로 듣게 된다. ‘우리의 노동 생활을 끊임없는 방해와 중단으로 괴롭히고 부사관의 사고방식을 우리의 소년과 청년들에게 가장 낮은 학년까지 이식하려 하는, 현재의 군국주의보다 훨씬 더 나쁜, 열정적인 민병대론자들이 있다. 이런 종류의 군사적 침해와 징발을 확대하는 데 각각 그리고 모두 적대하는 민병대 반대자들이 있다’ [Die Neue Zeit (1898-9), 580-81]
이 문제들에서 다른 모든 문제처럼 부르주아 정치인들이 원칙에 따른 입장을 취하지 않고 기회주의 정책을 따른다는 사실이 사회민주주의자인 쉬펠이 그 자신 또한 같은 권리를 가진다고 결론내리게 했다. 그는 그러므로 필연적으로 보호관세와 군국주의 안의 반동적인 핵심을, 역으로 자유무역과 민병대의 진보적 중요성을 인식하는데 실패한다, 즉 그는 두 문제에 대해 원칙에 의거한 입장을 취하는 것 또한 실패한다.
두번째로, 우리는 그의 입장이 두 주제 모두에서 보호관세 정책과 군국주의의 개별적 악에는 반대하지만 전체로서 두 현상에 반대하는 것은 단호히 거부하는 것을 보게 된다. 슈투트가르트에서의 쉬펠의 강의에서 우리는 과도한 개별 보호관세에 맞서 싸우는 것이 필수적이라고 들으나 동시에 '전념'하지 말고 우리 자신을 '속박하지' 말라는, 즉 보호관세를 항상 그리고 모든 곳에서 반대하지 말라는 경고를 듣게 된다. 이제 우리는 비록 쉬펠이 '의회와 선동으로 수행되는 구체적인 군사적 요구들에 대한 투쟁'’ [Sozialistische Monatshefte, November 1898, p.495.]은 거부하지 않으나 그가 '현존하는 사회 영역들에서 순전히 외부적이고 우연적인 사건과 매우 부수적인, 하지만 인정하건대 또한 매우 눈에 띄는, (군국주의의) 반응을 군국주의의 본질이자 핵심으로 받아들이는 것'에 대해 경고하는 것을 듣게 된다. [Die Neue Zeit (1 no.19)]
세번째 그리고 마지막으로, 위에서 언급한 두 관점의 기반은 양쪽 모두 현상을 전적으로 이전의 부르주아적 발전의 관점에서만, 즉 그들의 역사적으로 조건지어진 진보적 측면에서만, 더 나아가 그들의 반동적 측면을 드러내는 임박한 발전을 철저히 무시하며 평가하는 데 있다. 쉬펠에게 보호관세는 그것이 고 프리드리히 리스트의 시대, 반세기도 더 전에 그랬던 것과 마찬가지로 여전히 독일의 중세적-봉건적 경제의 파편화를 넘어선 위대한 전진이다. 오늘날 보편적 자유무역은 이미 국가 경제 구조을 넘어서서 통합된 세계 경제로 가는 똑같이 필연적인 진전을 대변하며, 그러므로 오늘날의 국가 관세 장벽을 반동적인 것으로 만든다. 그러나 이 사실은, 쉬펠에게 있어서는, 존재하지 않는다.
군국주의 문제에 있어서도 진실은 같다. 그는 아직도 보편적이고 강제적인 징집에 기반한 상비군이 과거의 모병군과 봉건군에 비교해서 거대한 전진이었던 때와 같은 관점에서 그 문제에 접근한다. 하지만 여기서 발전은 쉬펠에게 있어서만큼은 멈춰버린다, 역사는 보편적 징병을 더 확대하는 것을 제외하면 상비군 이상으로 진보하지 않는다.
그렇다면 관세와 군사 문제들에 있어서 쉬펠이 채택한 특징적 입장들의 중요성은 무엇인가? 그것들은 첫번째로는 원칙에 기반한 정책이 아니라 임기응변 정책을 강조하며, 이것과 연결되어 두번째로 그것들은 관세와 군사 체계의 오용만을 공격할 뿐 체계 자체를 공격하지는 않는다. 하지만 그렇다면 이 정책이 우리가 최근 당 역사에서 잘 알게 된 것, 즉 기회주의가 아니라면 무엇인가?
이세그림-쉬펠이 우리의 전체 정치 강령의 근본적인 요점 중 하나인 민병대 공리를 공개적으로 포기하자 또다시 '실용 정치'가 그들의 승리를 축하하고 있다. 당의 관점에서 쉬펠의 등장의 진짜 중요성은 여기에 놓여있다. 이 군국주의를 지지하는 사회민주주의의 가장 최근의 성명은 오직 이 전체 조류와 연결시키고 기회주의의 일반적 기반과 귀결의 관점에서 보아야만 정확히 판단하고 평가할 수 있다.
